EU Age-Ver App Hacked in 2 Minutes

🔑 Enhanced Key Takeaways

• •The app's security bypass relies on modifying local configuration files to disable PIN and biometric authentication, which allows attackers to reuse identity data under a newly defined access control profile.
• •A separate, more fundamental architectural flaw identified in March 2026 reveals that the system's issuer component cannot cryptographically verify that passport validation actually occurred on the user's device, creating a trust gap that cannot be easily fixed without compromising privacy.
• •The app requires integration with Google's Play Integrity API on Android, which has drawn criticism for locking out alternative Android distributions and raising concerns about the centralization of identity data.

🛠️ Technical Deep Dive

• •Local PIN and biometric authentication bypass: Achieved by deleting specific values in local configuration files, allowing the app to reset access controls while retaining existing identity credentials.
• •Architectural trust flaw: The issuer component lacks a mechanism to confirm that the passport verification process was executed on the user's device, potentially allowing for spoofed verification signals.
• •Dependency: The Android implementation relies on Google's Play Integrity API for device attestation.
• •Data handling: The app is designed to use zero-knowledge proofs to provide age verification signals to third-party platforms without sharing raw identity data.

🔮 Future ImplicationsAI analysis grounded in cited sources

⏳ Timeline